Food & Sex: Authorial Wavering on Issues of Oral Performance in the Mānava-Dharmaśāstra and Vatsyayana Kamasutra

Food & Sex: Authorial Wavering on Issues of Oral Performance in the

Mānava-Dharmaśāstra and Vatsyayana Kamasutra

Sean Hillman

Doctoral student, South Asian Religions/Bioethics
Department for the Study of Religion, Joint Centre for Bioethics
University of Toronto

Introduction

This paper focuses on two ethical issues of conduct as found in two Sanskrit śāstric texts. Considering the umbrella of my doctoral work, which is an investigation of the influence of religious texts on conceptions of health and illness (and healthcare decision making) among contemporary Buddhist, Hindu and Jain adherents in India, this particular study grew out of my original idea to write on food (or diet) and sex as two aspects of health found in the two texts Mānava-Dharmaśāstra (or Manusmriti) and Vatsyayana Kamasutra. As the paper took shape it became clear that both of our authors, Manu and Vatsyayana, respectively have wavering positions when discussing particular topics of oral performance related to food and sex: specifically those of meat eating and oral sex. The Kamasutra’s earliest commentator, Yashodhara Indrapada, will also participate in the discusssion. Although it is not surprising that Manu has more to say about the eating of meat than does Vatsyayana, and Vatsyayana has more to say about oral sex than Manu (who actually doesn’t address it directly), each has something to say about the topics of meat and sex in general. Generally speaking, the authors all use the ‘escape clause’ technique to sometimes allow for these activities which are ordinarily proscribed, unconventional and considered polluting. What follows is an exploration of how the authors approach the topics, and some suggestions as to how they justify not taking a firm stance for or against the practices of meat eating and oral sex.       

Authorial Wavering on Meat Eating

He may eat meat when it is sacrificially consecrated, at the behest of Brahmins, when he is ritually commissioned according to the rule, and when his life is at risk (5.27, Olivelle 2004: 87).

Extreme hunger is enough to allow for the trumping of any restrictions on meat-eating. Among the times that Manu allows for the eating of meat are those that occur “when you would other wise starve to death (10.105-08).” (Doniger 2009: 318) The verse preceding those Doniger is citing reads: “When someone facing death eats food given by anyone at all, he remains unsullied by sin, as the sky by mud (10.104, Doniger/Kakar 2002: 187).” This ‘escape clause,’ to use Doniger’s term, is referring to the suspension of the rules around the appropriateness of the person from whom one receives food, not the food itself. It seems slightly disjointed to then follow this statement, as the text does, not with examples of people receiving food from inappropriate donors, but rather with four examples of people who have sought or received types of meat that would ordinarily be forbidden by Manu. Regarding the allowance for receiving inappropriate food itself, the passage in question starts in this way: “Ajīgarta, tormented by hunger, went up to his son to kill him; and he was not tainted with sin, as he was seeking to allay his hunger (10.105, Olivelle 2004: 187).” This is followed by three more anecdotal verses where  starvation leads to the wish to eat, or actual consumption, of various ‘distasteful’ types of meat: that of a dog, cows and the hindquarters of a dog. What is strikingly odd about Doniger’s use of these verses as examples of Manu’s allowance for eating meat when one’s life is at stake in the “When you may, or may not, eat meat” subsection of her chapter on “Escape Clauses in the Shastras,” is that the characters mentioned are not merely eating (or considering eating) meat because they are starving. One is prepared to kill a human, and his son no less, in order to eat him! Next to this potential cannibalism is placed the allusion towards the killing and eating of cows (they are merely procured in the anecdote), and both the wish to eat and actual consumption of dogs. This placement is, doubtless, quite significant. Despite the contested idea of the sacred cow in India, Jha’s 2002 The Myth of the Holy Cow having “marshalled abundant proof that Hindus did eat beef in the ancient period (Doniger 2009: 657), and Manu’s text wavering on the matter of meat eating, it seems as though these four types of meat-eating (consuming flesh of humans, dogs, cows, and dog rumps respectively) are categorized together because they show the outer limits of eating meat for the sake of saving one’s own or another’s life when on the verge of starvation. They are the worst possible meats that a person could eat, and can be eaten only under the worst circumstances. Other than the extremity of the action matching the extremity of the need, that the most horrible types of meat eating can only occur when the most horrible conditions of life are reached, that being a starvation that brings one to the brink of death, are there any other indications in the text that these meats are despicable? Indeed there are. According to Manu, certain types of meat eating warrant certain punishments, and can only be rectified by certain types of purificatory penance.

Doniger states that in Manu’s text “not only are there punishments for humans who eat or sell certain animals, but there are also punishments for humans who eat or sell humans, including their sons or themselves, or who sell their wives (which Manu both permits and punishes) (Doniger 2009: 319).” Perhaps Doniger is equating the selling and eating of humans because the verses she cites to support the above statement have only to do with the selling of humans and do not at all refer to eating humans. Perhaps, also, she is assuming Manu similarly equates the two.

Needless to say, the result of selling humans is socially and existentially disastrous: selling oneself or a wife or son is a secondary sin causing loss of caste (11.60, 62, Olivelle 2004: 194). There are other actions relevant to our discussion included in this category of “secondary sins causing loss of caste:” killing a cow (11.60 Olivelle 2004: 194) and eating reprehensible food (11.65 Olivelle 2004: 194). It is likely not a coincidence that these three actions, selling relatives (and perhaps eating them), killing cows and eating reprehensible food are grouped together here as types of sins and grouped together again in the discussion on actions that are not morally reprehensible when committed out of extreme hunger. They are not the worst actions one can engage in, such as the “grievous sins causing loss of caste” like killing a Brahmin (11.55 Olivelle 2004: 194), but as the next level of sin they are also depicted as quite negative. Demonstrating how negative these actions are is further support for the view that Manu considers the preservation of human life as more important than refraining from the commission of secondary sins. Preserving life by committing grievous sins might be going too far, but it will be sufficient to say that the preservation of human life ranks quite highly in Manu’s agenda in presenting a vision for society. Not only does life-threatening hunger allow for the bending of dietary rules, these sins can be purified through penance. Primacy is given to cow slaughter, but someone who commits any such secondary sin, by follow Manu’s recommendations involving various types of deference to cows, “in three months he rids himself of the sin (11.118, Olivelle 2004: 198).” There are “penances for eating forbidden food” as well (Olivelle 2004: 201). For eating the meat of a human and other carnivores one can perform the “hot-arduous penance (11.157 Olivelle 2004: 201),” a type of “generic penance” called Taptakṛcchra involving imbibing hot liquids and bathing “with a collected mind” in three-day cycles (11.215, Olivelle 2004: 206). Dog meat is not included among the forbidden foods for which these penances are prescribed.    

Keeping in mind Manu’s grouping together the eating of beef and human meat, it is striking to read the following in Kosambi’s The Culture and Civilisation of Ancient India in Historical Outline: “a modern orthodox Hindu would place beef-eating on the same level as cannibalism, whereas Vedic Brahmins had fattened upon a steady diet of sacrificed beef (Kosambi 1965: 102).” Manu seems to be similarly levelling beef-eating and cannibalism, extended from our specific examples of gearing up to kill a human and procuring cows with the intent to kill them, by sequentially placing them close together. Why? Doniger offers the idea that “[c]ows already in early Sanskrit texts came to symbolize Brahmins, since a Brahmin without a cow is less than a complete Brahmin, and killing a cow (except in a sacrifice) was equated with killing a Brahmin (Doniger 2009: 658).” Brahmin identification is a tempting possibility given the reification of the Brahmin throughout Manu’s text, and is strengthened by equating other actions with Brahmin killing. Manu gives the wasting of male seed the same equivalency, in that any wasted opportunity to procreate is a wasted opportunity to potentially conceive a Brahmin child. Lal adds doubt to this line of reasoning by referencing Manu’s fence-sitting on the issue while tracing the ban on cow slaughter by saying that

it should be noted that this ban evolved gradually during Vedic times. It is apparent from the Hindu sacred texts that it was not until the later Puranas were written (which were probably reflecting conditions about the fifth and sixth centuries AD) that bans on cow slaughter became firmly established as part of the Hindu moral code. Thus, the Vedic literature of the early nomadic Aryan invaders does not have any absolute prohibition on cow slaughter, nor does the Manu Smriti, which provides the codification of the caste system, nor does the Arthashastra. All these sources stress the usefulness of bovines in providing food and traction, and seem to suggest that in normal times cattle, particularly cows, were not to be slaughtered because they were productive and of economic value (Lal 2004: 69)…

Some say that the ban comes from a more recent historical move by Hindus to strongly distinguish their identity against the beef-eating Muslims. Regardless, although Manu does not absolutely prohibit the killing of cows, it seems that he considers it highly undesirable and, placing great importance on sustaining life at all ethical or social costs, offered as a last resort. What about dogs? The distaste with dog-meat (pun intended) seems to have a long history in India where “in the predominantly nomadic pastoral society of the Vedic Aryans it was natural to eat the food produced by the kill, though it is stated at some places that the flesh of animals like dogs was thrown to the demons (Jha 2002: 32).” There are other indications that dog meat was unacceptable in India further along the historical timeline. In a contemporary commentary of the Buddhist monastic discipline code, the Vinaya, several types of meat are forbidden:

The following types of meat are unallowable: that of human beings, elephants, horses, dogs, snakes, lions, tigers, leopards, bears, and hyenas. Human beings, horses, and elephants were regarded as too noble to be used as food. The other types of meat were forbidden either on grounds that they were repulsive ("People criticized and complained and spread it about, 'How can these Sakyan-son monks eat dog meat? Dogs are loathsome, disgusting'") or dangerous (bhikkhus, smelling of lion's flesh, went into the jungle; the lions there, instead of criticizing or complaining, attacked them). (Thanissaro 2011)

The reasoning behind avoidance of these meats was the maintenance of a good reputation for the order, and safety. Since the community of Buddhist mendicants relied on the generosity of Indian donors for resources, the image of the group as perceived by the laity was crucial for the survival of the order. If this commentary at all reflects the admonishments for the order at the time of the Buddha, it could be telling us what Indians thought about dogs and the eating of dog-meat. Sources which indicate that forbidden meats such as those of dog and elephant were used disruptively in tantric practice do the same. Even today in India, I can say from experience, dogs are considered loathsome and dirty. Strays are beaten needlessly, and when domesticated they are either tethered on one’s property as watchdogs, or kept as a protector to be walked down the road with a thick chain around their neck, held close because if let go or provoked they would attack. I have nary seen a dog being walked in a manner in which it seems that they are considered a companion. At the seminary in which I lived and studied, I was strongly criticized for my attempts to take care of the dogs on the property. Strange looks came my way when I set up a watering device akin to those in hamster cages; I was encouraged to wear an additional pair of gloves when administering a flea-bath; admonished by the principal for caring for strays (and thus encouraging the dogs to remain on the property) because there had been an incident where a dog killed one of the local’s goats; called a “dog-killer” when I gave mange medicine that resulted in some extremely sick dogs dying (sending me a clear message that they thought it better to leave them alone than to try to help them); and now and then all the strays would be rounded up and taken far away from the property. Needless to say, dogs are not regarded highly in this community in India. The eating of dogs: unthinkable.

If Doniger wanted to strengthen her position that Manu strategically manipulates meat-eating as

an escape clause, why does she only casually point to these verses as examples of meat-eating being allowable under the circumstances of starvation, and not include an explicit mention of the powerfully shocking fact that these verses are actually quite subversive in that they refer to highly unacceptable forms of meat-eating? Perhaps she is avoiding the baggage that comes with these striking verses: infanticide, cannibalism, cow-slaughter, and beef and dog consumption. Indeed, these are exceptionally loaded issues, much more so than that of eating meat in and of itself.

            Before moving to our next issue of oral performance, it is important to note that the Kamasutra also is conflicted regarding the eating of meat:

The Kama-sutra too regards abstention from meat as the paradigmatic act of dharma, yet it notes that people do generally eat meat. Elsewhere too it assumes that the reader of the text will eat meat, as when it recommends, after lovemaking, a midnight supper of “some bite-sized snacks: fruit juice, grilled foods sour rice broth, soups with small pieces of roasted meats, mangoes, dried meat, and citrus fruits with sugar, according to the tastes of the region (2.10.7-8) (Doniger 2009: 320).

The text also has something to say about the eating of dog meat. “But even Vatsyayana,” who we could see as sometimes not entirely committed to the brahmanical hardline, “draws the line at dog meat. In arguing that one should not do something stupid just because a text (including his own) tells you to do it, he quotes a verse:

Medical science, for example,

Recommends cooking even dog meat,

For juice and virility;

But what intelligent person would eat it? (2.9.42)

It seems, however, that he objects to dog meat on aesthetic rather than dogmatic grounds (Doniger 2009: 320).” This is unlike Manu’s proscription against (and prescribed penances for) eating forbidden meats.

Doniger notes that Vatsyayana’s text distinguishes between an ‘ordinary life’ and what we might call a ‘religious one:’

The Kama-sutra, in the course of a most idiosyncratic definition of dharma, takes meat eating to be a normal part of ordinary life but, at the same time, regards vegetarianism as one of the two defining characteristics of dharma (the other being sacrifice, which often involves the death of animals): Dharma consists in doing things, like sacrifice, that are divorced from material life and refraining from things, like eating meat, that are a part of ordinary life (2.2.7) (Doniger 2009: 316).

Doniger (or her editor) has actually cited the wrong verse here. Verse 1.2.7, in her own translation, is the appropriate one and reads: “Religion consists in engaging, as the texts decree, in sacrifice and other such actions that are disengaged from material life, because they are not of this world and their results are invisible; and in refraining, as the texts decree, from eating meat and other such actions that are engaged in material life, because they are of this world and their results are visible (1.2.7 Doniger/Kakar 2002: 8).” As a segue into our next section, a question: are there other activities in the Kamasutra that are deemed a part of ordinary life and which, similar to Manu’s wavering on the issue of meat-eating, are held by Vatsyayana as bringing higher-order benefit if avoided through restraint but ultimately left up to the person themselves to decide whether to engage in them or not? The answer is yes. One of these is the act of oral sex.  

Authorial Wavering on Oral Sex

There are some men,

And there are certain sorts of regions,

And there are times when

These [oral sex] practices are not without their uses.

Therefore, when a man has considered

The region, and the time, and the technique,

And the textbook teachings, and himself,

He may - or may not – make use of these [oral sex] practices

(2.9.43-44, Doniger/Kakar 2002: 69).   

Is there a connection between meat eating and oral sex? For one thing, they both are performances involving the mouth. I also intend to show that as with Manu and meat-eating, Vatsyayana gives both the orthodox stance and leaves an out for people to engage in oral sex. Pollution, too, features prominently in discussions of both practices. Interestingly, there is a connection made between the two practices in the Kamasutra. As we saw earlier, Vatsyayana mentions the eating of dog meat and outright eschews the practice:

Medical science, for example,

Recommends cooking even dog meat,

For juice and virility;

But what intelligent person would eat it? (2.9.42) (Doniger 2009: 320)

This verse is not used by the author merely to encourage the reader to not blindly follow whatever a text says, but it is placed within the context of his section on oral sex specifically to leave such a practice open to individuals. Let us explore how Vatsyayana approaches our second contentious issue.  

Vatsyayana and Yashodhara Indrapada, the author of the earliest Sanskrit commentary on the Kamasutra, are both fairly convinced that oral sex should be avoided, for several reasons. After presenting a list of marginalized females that perform oral sex, such as ‘loose women,’ the Kamasutra text starts with a quoted admonition: “Scholars say: ‘But [oral sex] should not be done, because it is opposed by the moral code and is not done in proper society, and because if a man has contact again with the mouth of these women, he himself may be troubled (2.9.26, Doniger/Kakar 2002: 67).”  Of the three reasons given, the first has to do with śāstric proscription against oral sex, the second with social conventions and the last with the male recipient being disconcerted when contacting the mouth of the female that has had contact with his own genetalia. We will look at each of these. Regarding the first, to what does ‘moral code’ refer? Doniger places both of our texts within the category of śāstra:

The erotic science to which these texts [such as the Kamasutra and Anangaranga] belong, known as kama-shastra (‘the science of kama’), is one of the three principal human sciences in ancient India, the other two being religious and social law (dharma-shastra, of which the most famous work is attributed to Manu…known as the Laws of Manu) and the science of political and economic power (arthashastra…)  (Doniger/Kakar 2002: xii).

Olivelle notes that śāstric authors incorporate other works and positions into their own:

An individual belonging to and writing within a tradition of expert knowledge (śāstra) is likely to compare and contrast his or her views to other exponents of that tradition. Modern scholars do this by means of bibliographical notes. Ancient Indian scholars resorted to several strategies, including citation of authoritative works, as well as presenting and combating opposing (pūrvapakṣa) views. (Olivelle 2002: 535)

In this case, even though not explicitly referred to, Vatsyayana could well be be referring to the Manava-Dharmashastra when giving authority to an unnamed ‘moral code.’ Manu’s text does have something to say, albeit indirectly, about oral sex. Firstly, Manu does not require sexual activity to be solely for procreation. When discussing marriage, under the subsection of “sexual union” Manu says this of the sexual advances of husband toward his wife: “Devoted solely to her, he may go to her also when he wants sexual pleasure (3.45, Olivelle 2004: 46)…” Despite this, such activity is limited in scope. Under “Penances for Sexual Offences” we find this: “If someone ejaculates his semen…in any place other than the vagina…he should perform the Sāntapana penance (11.174, Olivelle 2004: 203)” which is another type of generic penance similar to our previously mentioned penance for eating forbidden meat. Putting aside briefly this additional connection between the eating of forbidden meat and the performance of oral sex, in that they are both to be addressed with penances under the same general category, we must state the obvious that oral sex does not necessitate sexual fluid entering the mouth. However, Yashodhara’s commentary to verse 2.9.26 does connect oral sex with sexual fluid entering the mouth: “It is forbidden by dharma texts: ‘Do not ejaculate in a mouth (2.9.26 commentarial note, Doniger/Kakar 2002: 67).’” Here the onus placed on the male as it does not say ‘do not receive ejaculate in your mouth.’ Here also Yashodhara clarifies what is meant by the third reason for not engaging in oral sex, that it could be troubling to the man: “…if he performs in the mouth of one of these women…the act that should be done in the vagina, then, at the time when the act is done in the vagina, if he again touches her mouth, in the throes of passion, he himself will be disturbed, saying, ‘I have been debauched’, but the woman will not be disturbed by this (2.9.26 note, Doniger/Kakar 2002: 67).”

Before coming to the conclusion that women are made to be more perverse than men because they are not offended by having sexual fluids in their mouth, I think it is important to make the distinction that the problem here seems to be the potential for having one’s mouth exposed to one’s own sexual fluids. Yashodhara hints at this also in the commentary on the following verse which states that oral sex “should be avoided…because of the dangers involved in contact with the mouth…and because one also eats food with the mouth (2.9.27 commentarial note, Doniger/Kakar 2002: 67).” It is not clear what ‘dangers’ the commentator is referring to, but it could possibly have to do with health concerns such as hygiene and the transmission of disease. What is more likely, however, is that the ‘danger’ merely refers to contact with one’s own sexual fluids, or at least with something that has contacted one’s own genitalia, which is presented in the text as distasteful to the quoted scholars. Such contact might be seen as contaminating, or polluting. It is not a superimposition on the text to surmise that oral sex can pollute. In quoting the people of a region called Surasena, apparently an extremely liberal group sexually, Vatsyayana himself brings pollution into the discussion of oral sex: “they say: ‘…the religious tradition tells us to regard [women] as pure…and a woman’s mouth…is unpolluted…in the ecstasy of sex (2.9.33 commentarial note, Doniger/Kakar 2002: 68).’” Using the hemeneutics of suspicion, we can glean from this that the most common position on oral sex was likely to see it as a polluting act. Otherwise, Vatsyayana would not have to include such a verse and wouldn’t have given it the important position of immediately preceding his prose conclusion of the section on oral sex. He means to drive this disruptive point home. Additional support for the idea that the ingestion of sexual fluids was seen as polluting by both the orthodox religious traditions and the general populace comes from tantric practice. White discusses this phenomenon at length in his book Kiss of the Yogini: "Tantric Sex" in its South Asian Contexts: “In Hindu contexts, the Tantric Virile Hero generated and partook of his own and his consort’s vital fluids in a “eucharistic” ritual, whose ultimate consumer was the Goddess herself, who, pleased, would afford the supernatural enjoyments and powers the practitioner sought (White 2006: 73-74).” Consciously partaking of substances that the orthodox Indian traditions consider polluting, such as forbidden meats, alcohol and sexual fluids, is a subversive attempt by the heterodox tantrikas to turn on their head traditionalist views and social norms concerning purity and pollution. Since the “Indian traditions have always viewed sexual fluids…as polluting, powerful, and therefore dangerous substances (White 2006: 67),” it is not merely an act of subversion to partake of them but also an attempt at transformation by harnessing the consciousness-altering abilities of these ‘power substances:’ “Elite practitioners self-consciously subverted orthodox purity codes by by manipulating sexual fluids as a means of effecting a powerful expansion of consciousness from the limited consciousness of the conformist Brahmin practitioner to the all-encompassing “god-consciousness” of the Tantric superman (White 2006: 68).” It is safe to say, then, that all three of our authors were steeped in the orthodox traditional view of oral sex as potentially polluting, and that any allowances made for the practice would be remarkably subversive for a śāstra.

Yashodhara adds two additional reasons for avoiding oral sex: if it is done with one’s wife it brings hunger to one’s ancestors, and because it is an act done in secret. Regarding the first, it is not evident how this happens. Is it some retrograde karmic effect? The use of the term ‘ancestor’ in the translation is intentional, and rather than meaning future-directed ‘descendents’ it seems to be closer in meaning to familial predecessors. Does it affect one’s deceased predecessors in their current status in cyclic existence? Regarding the latter reason for avoiding oral sex, why is oral sex done in secret? Wouldn’t all sexual activity by done in privacy? Does this mean that sexual activity that lands squarely within the constraints of social norms can be spoken about openly, but that oral sex must be kept hidden from conversation? It is not clear.

Pollution by oral contact with a mouth that has contacted one’s own genitalia and/or sexual fluids is a concern to both authors. As we noted in our earlier discussion, pollution is a common Indian concern with foods also. Manu prefers vegetarianism, but if meat is to be eaten certain animals are to be avoided, such as those that eat other animals. We can infer that this is because all of the impurities of the animals eaten by the carnivore are taken in when a human ingests such a carnivore. Then, under dire circumstances, even such normally forbidden meat is allowable. Similarly, both Vatsyayana and Yashodhara start off by quoting other sources that hold that it is preferable to avoid oral sex (and both further problematize ejaculating in a mouth), and then both authors relent by giving an escape clause for oral sex. Vatsyayana states that oral sex “is not a mistake for a man who loves courtesans (2.9.27, Doniger/Kakar 2002: 67)” and that because there are reasons to avoid it, operationally there are differing views on the practice. He then proceeds to give five regional variations on approaches to oral sex: some avoid it altogether, some do not have intercourse with women who engage in it, some have intercourse with them but avoid their mouth, and some are willing to do anything. (2.9.28-32, Doniger/Kakar 2002: 67).” Yashodhara sees this regional variation as a way to bend any normative stance against it: “according to the customs of a particular region…[oral sex] might not have to be avoided (2.9.27 commentarial note, Doniger/Kakar 2002: 67).”    

Regardless of all of the reasons given against oral sex, there is no firm stance against the practice by either Vatsyayana or Yashodhara. They both give reasons to avoid it, and examples of those that avoid and practice it, and leave the decision up to the individual.   

Conclusion

Neither Manu nor Vatsyayana take a firm stance in their texts on the respective issues of meat-eating and oral sex. In the Mānava-Dharmaśāstra Manu demonstrates his valuing of vegetarianism and the avoidance of unconventional or forbidden meats in many instances and in many ways, including outright admonition as well as penance prescription for lapses. Yet his ‘times of adversity’ escape clause technique, citing starvation as the prime context, allows readers entirely free range to engage in meat eating, including the possibility of cannibalism.

As for the Kamasutra, Vatsyayana and his earliest commentator Yashodhara employ similar techniques in presenting the orthodox stance on oral sex: quoting authoritative sources. Both show concern for social norms, śāstric proscription and the issue of pollution. Ultimately, both authors cite regional variation and personal disposition as a way of determining whether to partake in the activity or not, and in so doing give readers free range to engage in oral sex.

Vatsyayana perhaps says it best when explaining such authorial wavering on our hotly contested issues of meat eating and oral sex: “Since learned men disagree and there are discrepancies in what the religious texts say, one should act according to the custom of the region and one’s own disposition and confidence (2.9.34, Doniger/Kakar 2002: 68).”   

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